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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER
SECTION 304 OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
YERACHMIEL E. WEINSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 304 of the Internal Revenue Code1 is a tax plan-
* B.A. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1975; J.D. Marquette University,
1980. Since writing this article, Attorney Weinstein has joined the Internal Revenue
Service in its Washington, D.C. office. This article represents the author's personal
opinion and does not in any way reflect the position of the Service on any issue.
1. I.R.C. § 304, entitled "Redemption Through Use of Related Corporations,"
reads as follows:
(a) Treatment of Certain Stock Purchases. -
(1) Acquisition by related corporation (other than subsidiary). - For pur-
poses of sections 302 and 303, if -
(A) one or more persons are in control of each of two corporations,
and
(B) in return for property, one of the corporations acquires stock in
the other corporation from the person (or persons) so in control,
then (unless paragraph (2) applies) such property shall be treated as a distri-
bution in redemption of the stock of the corporation acquiring such stock. In
any such case, the stock so acquired shall be treated as having been transferred
by the person from whom acquired, and as having been received by the corpo-
ration acquiring it, as a contribution to the capital of such corporation.
(2) Acquisition by subsidiary.-For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if -
(A) in return for property, one corporation acquires from a share-
holder of another corporation stock in such other corporation, and
(B) the issuing corporation controls the acquiring corporation,
then such property shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of the stock
of the issuing corporation.
(b) Special Rules for Application of Subsection (a). -
(1) Rule for determinations under section 302(b). - In the case of any ac-
quisition of stock to which subsection (a) of this section applies, determina-
tions as to whether the acquisition is, by reason of section 302(b), to be treated
as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock shall be
made by reference to the stock of the issuing corporation. In applying section
318(a) (relating to constructive ownership of stock) with respect to section
302(b) for purposes of this paragraph, sections 318(a)(2)(C) and 318(a)(3)(C)
shall be applied without regard to the 50 percent limitation contained therein.
(2) Amount constituting dividend. -
(A) Where subsection (a) (1) applies. - In the case of any acquisi-
.tion of stock to which paragraph (1) (and not paragraph (2)) of subsec-
tion (a) of this section applies, the determination of the amount which is
a dividend shall be made solely by reference to the earnings and profits
of the acquiring corporation.
(B) Where subsection (a) (2) applies. - In the case of any acquisi-
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ner's nightmare.2 This is true for at least three reasons: (1) the
section is a very potent weapon in the hands of the Commis-
sioner for recasting transactions falling within its express
terms; (2) it is plagued with internal inconsistencies which
shed doubt on the way a particular qualifying transaction will
be characterized; and (3) it is capable of being construed to
cover a host of other transactions not expressly falling within
its terms.
First, this article will examine the structure and operation
of section 304 in terms of the types of transactions it was in-
tended to cover. This will include a historical analysis to Mus-
trate the reasons for the section's enactment. Second, a dis-
cussion of the uncertainties and inconsistencies in the
operation of section 304 will be presented, with a view toward
determining what light, if any, has been shed on some of these
problems by recent judicial and administrative developments.
Finally, a number of areas of potential conflict between sec-
tion 304 and other Code sections will be examined, along with
many of the suggestions which have been made as to possible
resolutions of these conflicts.
tion of stock to which subsection (a) (2) of this section applies, the de-
termination of the amount which is a dividend shall be made as if the
property were distributed by the acquiring corporation to the issuing
corporation and immediately thereafter distributed by the issuing
corporation.
(c) Control. -
(1) In general. - For purposes of this section, control means the ownership
of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least 50 percent of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock. If a person (or persons) is in control (within the
meaning of the preceding sentence) of a corporation which in turn owns at
least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote
of another corporation, or owns at least 50 percent of the total value of the
shares of all classes of stock of another corporation, then such person (or per-
sons) shall be treated as in control of such other corporation.
(2) Constructive ownership. - Section 318(a) (relating to the constructive
ownership of stock) shall apply for purposes of determining control under par-
agraph (1). For purposes of the preceding sentence, sections 318(a)(2)(C) and
318(a)(3)(C) shall be applied without regard to the 50 percent limitation con-
tained therein.
2. Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions Through Related
Corporations, 22 TAx L. REv. 161, 216 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Marans].
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I. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF SECTION 304
A. Historical Background
Section 304 is primarily intended as a reinforcement to the
corporate distribution and redemption provisions of sections
301 and 302.s Before the enactment of section 304, these pro-
visions were capable of being easily circumvented by the use
of a related corporation. This can be illustrated by the pre-
section 304 case of Rodman Wanamaker Trust v. Commis-
sioner,4 in which the taxpayer, who owned virtually all the
stock of the parent corporation,5 sold part of that stock to the
parent corporation's wholly-owned subsidiary.6 The economic
effect of that transaction was identical to a redemption by the
parent of its own stock, which would be essentially equivalent
to a dividend under section 115(g) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939. This is because the taxpayer, by reason of the
sale to the subsidiary, did not lose any control over the eco-
nomic unit; virtually the only stock of the parent not held by
the taxpayer after the transaction was held by a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the parent. The Commissioner argued that since
the taxpayer's control was undiluted by reason of the sale, the
result was no different than if a partial redemption by the
parent of its own stock had taken place. However, this argu-
ment was rejected by the court because section 115(g) re-
quired a redemption by a corporation of its own stock.7
This line of reasoning left a rather large loophole in the
redemption provisions of the Code. Congress eliminated the
loophole by enacting section 115(g)(2) 8 to cover the parent-
subsidiary situation present in the Wanamaker case. The
3. Cf. Blaschka v. United States, 393 F.2d 983, 986 (Ct. CI. 1968) ("The function
of § 304, then, is to compliment § 302.") See generally Brown, Prescriptions for Tax-
Treating Redemption Facsimiles, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 757, 758-59 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Brown]; Kempf, Section 304 of the Internal Revenue Code: Unmasking Dis-
guised Dividends in Related Corporation Transactions, 33 U. Cm. L. Ray. 60, 61-64
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Kempf]; Marans, supra note 2, at 161-62.
4. 11 T.C. 365 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 178 F.2d 10 (3rd Cir. 1949).
5. John Wanamaker Corporation of Philadelphia.
6. John Wanamaker Corporation of New York.
7. The Tax Court cited Mead Corp. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1940),
which held that the predecessor of the accumulated earnings tax provisions in the
1939 Code did not apply to accumulations by a subsidiary to avoid tax on the share-
holders of the parent. See Kempf, supra note 3, at 62 n.4.
8. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994 § 209(a), 64 Stat. 932 (1950).
1980]
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House" proposed an amendment covering brother-sister cor-
porations, that is, when the same shareholders control two
corporations, while neither of the corporations controls the
other. The Senate,10 however, rejected the House proposal,
reasoning that the brother-sister situation was not as ripe for
abuse.11 The House view of the matter proved to be unusually
prescient, for the brother-sister situation was soon thereafter
presented to the Tax Court in Emma Cramer.1 2
The Emma Cramer case involved a family who, either di-
rectly or beneficially, held all the stock in four corporations
and who proceeded to sell the stock of three of them to the
fourth which then liquidated the other three. Because tax-
payer succeeded in bailing-out the earnings and profits of
three corporations, it is understandable that the Commis-
sioner wished to have these earnings and profits taxed to the
shareholder as dividends. The Tax Court, however, held
against the Commissioner. It reasoned that section 115(g)(2)
extended only to the parent-subsidiary situation, and that
section 115(a) (the predecessor to present section 301) did not
cover the situation, for to construe that section so broadly
would be to render section 115(g) (the redemption section)
meaningless.13 As such, the related corporation loophole still
existed even after the enactment of section 115(g)(2).
B. Present Section 304
When Congress revised the Internal Revenue Code in
1954, it responded to the problem of the related-corporation
loophole by enacting section 304. Coverage was expanded be-
yond that of the predecessor, section 115(g)(2) of the 1939
Code, to include the brother-sister situation involved in the
Cramer case. In addition, the reach of section 304 was ex-
tended further by incorporating with some modifications, the
9. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950-2 C.B. 380, 444. See
generally Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 701-02, 706-07 (7th
Cir. 1977). See also Kempf, supra note 3, at 62 n.7.
10. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950-2 C.B. 483, 514-15.
11. See Terry, Section 304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Redemptions
by Related Corporations, 3 WM. & MARY L. REv. 457, 466-67, 481-82 (1962). See also
Kempf, supra note 3, at 62 n.7.
12. 20 T.C. 679 (1953).
13. Id. at 684. See Kempf, supra note 3, at 63.
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new attribution rules of section 318. The major objective of
Congress was to prevent tax avoidance through "sales of stock
between corporations owned by the same interests."1 '
On its face, the structure of section 304 is not particularly
complex, considering the fact that its coverage was expanded
to include both parent-subsidiary and brother-sister situa-
tions. Section 304(a)(1), the rule for the brother-sister situa-
tion, states that when the same interests control two corpora-
tions and the stock of one (issuing corporation) is sold to the
other (acquiring corporation), the sale is treated as a redemp-
tion by the acquiring corporation. Since in reality none of the
stock of the acquiring corporation was actually redeemed so
that the number of shares outstanding was unchanged by the
sale, the section creates the legal fiction of a contribution to
the capital of the acquiring corporation in exchange for its
stock, followed by a redemption of that stock.
Section 304(a)(2) covers the parent-subsidiary situation. It
sets down the rule that where the shareholder of a parent cor-
poration sells stock of the parent to its subsidiary, the sale
will be treated as a redemption by the parent. Note that while
control of two corporations by the same shareholders is re-
quired in the brother-sister situation, the only control re-
quired in the parent-subsidiary situation is control by the par-
entof the subsidiary; the shareholders need not control either
corporation.
Section 304(b) deals with the treatment of the fictional re-
demption created by section 304(a). Paragraph (1) requires
that the test for dividend equivalency under section 302(b) is,
in all cases, to be made with reference to the stock of the issu-
ing corporation. It also eliminates, for purposes of the section
302(b) test, the fifty percent limitation on the operation of
corporate back attribution 5 and beneficial-interest attribu-
tion.16 Paragraph (2) of section 304(b) addresses itself to the
situation in which a redemption is characterized as the
equivalent of a dividend, and section 301, by way of section
302(d), is applicable. Since section 301(c)(1) refers to section
14. Compare S. RaP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1954) with HR. Rz. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1954). See Kempf, supra note 3, at 63-64 nn.16 & 17.
15. LR.C. § 318(a)(3)(C).
16. LR.C. § 318(a)(2)(C).
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316 to calculate the amount of the distribution constituting a
dividend according to accumulated and current earnings and
profits, the question arises as to which corporation's earnings
and profits are examined. Paragraph (2)(A) of section 304(b)
states that in the brother-sister situation the earnings and
profits of the acquiring corporation are used to determine the
amount of the dividend, while paragraph (2)(B) dictates that
in the parent-subsidiary situation, combined earnings and
profits of both the parent and the subsidiary are used. To ac-
complish this, a fictional distribution by the subsidiary to the
parent is created, in the amount of the redemption, which is
then used by the parent to redeem its own stock.
The last paragraph of'section 304(c) contains a number of
definitions. In paragraph (1), control is defined as the owner-
ship of stock comprising either 50% of voting power or 50%
of value. To avoid the dilution which results in situations of
corporate beneficial-interest attribution 17 by reason of the fact
that the percentage of stock owned by the corporation which
is attributed to the shareholder is limited to the shareholder's
percentage ownership of the corporation, the section goes on
to provide that wherever a shareholder owns a 50% or greater
interest in a corporation which owns a 50% or greater interest
in another corporation, for purposes of the section the share-
holder will be deemed to control the other corporation. Para-
graph (2) makes the attribution rules of section 318 applicable
to the determination of control, eliminating as before18 the
50% limitation on corporate back attribution and beneficial-
interest attribution.
With the application of the attribution rules, section 304
becomes a potent weapon indeed; it reaches situations in
which neither corporation controls the other nor does the
shareholder control either of them. For instance, if share-
holder X owns 25% of corporation A and 25% of corporation
B, and corporation A in turns owns another 25% in corpora-
tion B, X's 25% of corporation B will be attributed to corpo-
ration A by back attribution, giving corporation A 50% of
17. Id.
18. See I.R.C. § 304(b)(1) with respect to the elimination of the percentage limita-
tions on corporate attribution in testing for dividend equivalency under I.R.C.
§ 302(b).
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corporation B. Therefore, the parent-subsidiary situation is
created. The reach of section 304 was somewhat narrowed
when sidewise attribution was eliminated in 1964,19 but even
so it remains, by its terms, far-reaching. To compound the
aforementioned problems, there are a number of uncertainties
and inconsistencies in the operation of the section.
III. UNCERTAINTIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE OPERATION
OF SECTION 304
A. Overlap
Section 304 deals with two situations: the parent-subsidi-
ary situation and the brother-sister situation. The section in
two instances" gives preference to the parent-subsidiary char-
acterization when a transaction fits the definition of both situ-
ations. It can also be demonstrated that whenever the
brother-sister situation exists, the parent-subsidiary situation
also exists by application of the attribution rules.2 1 The
brother-sister situation requires that a shareholder, X, own at
least 50% of two corporations, A and B. But, by application of
corporate back attribution, 22 X's 50% ownership of corpora-
tion B is attributed to corporation A and his 50% of corpora-
tion A is attributed to corporation B. The result is that corpo-
ration A is the parent of corporation B and B is the parent of
A. The converse is not always true; the parent-subsidiary situ-
ation can exist without being recharacterized as a brother-sis-
ter situation. For example, if shareholder X owns 25% of cor-
porations A and B and at the same time, corporation A owns
25% of corporation B, X's 25% of corporation B will be at-
tributed to corporation A giving A control of B so that A is
the parent of B. But, owing to the percentage limitation on
corporate beneficial-interest attribution,2a there is no way to
attribute control of both corporations to X. Thus, while the
19. See S. REP. No. 1240, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See also Marans, supra
note 2, at 167. But see Tress. Reg. § 1.304-2(c) Ex. (2) (1961).
20. I.R.C. §§ 304(a)(1), 304(b)(2)(A).
21. Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 706 n.17 (7th Cir.
1977); B. BrrTKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 9-51 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Bittker & Eustice]; Brown,
supra note 3, at 775; Kempf, supra note 3, at 88; Marans, supra note 2, at 164.
22. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(C).
23. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C).
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parent-subsidiary situation does not necessarily imply the ex-
istence of the brother-sister situation, the brother-sister situa-
tion does necessarily imply the parent-subsidiary situation. If
the parent-subsidiary situation is to take precedence when-
ever both exist, the brother-sister situation is effectively read
out of the statute.
Many suggestions have been made for resolving this di-
lemma.2 ' For instance, it has been suggested that the brother-
sister situation be applied wherever it exists,2 5 but it is not
clear what this means. Where, for example, shareholder X
owns 100% of corporation A which owns 100% of corporation
B, the relationship is clearly one of parent-subsidiary, but it
can also be characterized as brother-sister by attributing cor-
poration A's 100% ownership of corporation B to X. To say
that the brother-sister characterization takes precedence runs
against the clear mandate of the statute.2 6 It has also been
suggested that the parent-subsidiary characterization be ap-
plied only when an actual parent-subsidiary relationship ex-
ists.2 7 However, this would take the example given above of a
shareholder owning 25% of two corporations along with one
corporation owning 25% of the other out of the section
altogether.2 8
Fortunately, some light has recently been shed on this
problem by the Seventh Circuit in Broadview Lumber Co. v.
United States.29 In discussing whether the contribution to
capital fiction which applies in the brother-sister situation 0
will also apply in the parent-subsidiary situation, the court
noted the overlap between the two81 and resolved the problem
by holding that the brother-sister characterization will apply
when, and only when, a brother-sister relationship exists with-
out resort to corporate attribution. 2 Although the court went
24. See generally Brown, supra note 3, at 775-77; Marans, supra note 2, at 165-
66.
25. Marans, supra note 2, at 165.
26. LR.C. §§ 304(a)(1) and 304(b)(2)(A).
27. Marans, supra note 2, at 166.
28. See id.
29. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977).
30. I.R.C. § 304(a)(1) (last sentence).
31. 561 F.2d at 706.
32. [The contribution to capital treatment of the acquired stock must apply
only to corporations which are actually related as brother-sister, even though
[Vol. 64:311
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on to state that the parent-subsidiary rules apply only when
such a relationship exists without corporate attribution,33 that
statement can be seen as dictum given the issue before the
court.34
The court's decision established a two-tiered order of pref-
erence in characterizing the corporate relationship as either
brother-sister or parent-subsidiary. The statutory preference
for the latter characterization, of course, remains in place. In
addition, there is a preference for characterizing the relation-
ship without resort to the corporate attribution rules. Where
the relationship can be characterized only as parent-subsidi-
ary, of course, that characterization will apply. The court
would have the parent-subsidiary preference control where ei-
ther both characterizations can be made without application
of the corporate attribution rules or where both can be made
only with application of those rules. However, when one char-
acterization can be made without application of the corporate
attribution rules, while the other can be made only with such
application, the preference for characterization without apply-
ing the attribution rules will control.
The principles of the preceding paragraph can be illus-
trated by way of the following examples: (1) X owns 25% of
corporations A and B, with corporation A owning 25% of cor-
poration B. Even with corporate attribution, the relationship
by resorting to the attribution of ownership rules one could convert what
would be a parent-subsidiary relationship into a brother-sister relationship
simply because one person or persons was also in control of the parent
corporation.
Id. at 709 (footnote omitted).
33. "Conversely, the redemption and distribution rules of section 304(a)(2) should
only apply when the parent corporation had the necessary control of the subsidiary
corporation without resort to constructively owned stock." Id. (footnote omitted).
34. The parent-subsidiary characterization issue arose in connection with the
question of whether the acquiring corporation purchased the stock of the issuing cor-
poration within the meaning of LR.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A)(ii). Under that section, the gain
on the involuntary conversion of property will qualify for nonrecognition only if the
property or stock purchased to replace the destroyed property is purchased in a
transaction in which the basis of purchased property or stock is equivalent to its cost.
The acquiring corporation purchased the stock in the issuing corporation because it
was engaged in a related business, having made the purchase with the insurance pro-
ceeds from the involuntary conversion of its assets and wished to qualify the purchase
for nonrecognition of the involuntary conversion gain under I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A)(ii).
Thus, the question of the acquiring corporation's basis in the issuing corporation's
stock was significant. 561 F.2d at 705.
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can only be characterized as parent-subsidiary, so that charac-
terization will be applied. (2) X owns 50% of corporation A
and B and corporation A owns the other 50% of corporation
B. Both characterizations can be made without applying the
corporate attribution rules, so the parent-subsidiary charac-
terization will take precedence. (3) X owns 100% of corpora-
tion A and 25 % of corporation B, with A owning another 25 %
of B. Both characterizations can be made, but only by apply-
ing the corporate attribution rules, so the parent-subsidiary
characterization will be applied. (4) X owns 100% of corpora-
tion A which, in turn, owns 100% of corporation B. The par-
ent-subsidiary' characterization can be made without the ap-
plication of the corporate attribution rules, but the brother-
sister characterization can only be made with such applica-
tion. The preference for characterization without attribution
will control, so the relationship will be cast as parent-subsidi-
ary. (5) X owns 50% of corporations A and B. The brother-
sister characterization exists without attribution while the
parent-subsidiary characterization exists only with attribu-
tion. The preference for characterization without corporate at-
tribution will control, and the relationship will be cast as
brother-sister.
This rule is consistent with the examples given in the regu-
lations.35 In the regulations, the brother-sister characteriza-
tion is applied when it exists without corporate attribution
even though the parent-subsidiary characterization would also
exist with such attribution. It should be noted that it is only
corporate attribution which is shunned where possible; family
attribution, for instance, would not affect the choice between
possible characterizations. 6 A further question may be raised:
If this is the rule, what is the purpose of the provision in the
section3 7 which deems shareholder X, a 50% shareholder of
corporation A, to have control of corporation B simply be-
cause corporation A has a 50% interest in B? The parent-sub-
sidiary relationship would exist even without the provision
and without the application of the corporate attribution rules;
therefore, such relationship should take precedence and there
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2(c), Ex. (1)-(4), as amended, T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126.
36. See id. Ex. (4) (involving family attribution).
37. I.R.C. § 304(c)(1) (last sentence).
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is no need for the provision. The provision is also unnecessary
if the real parent becomes the acquiring corporation because,
even without such a provision the shareholder's control of the
acquiring corporation would be attributed to the issuing cor-
poration and the parent-subsidiary relationship will exist by
attribution. Since the brother-sister relationship also exists
only by attribution, the former relationship should take prece-
dence regardless of the provision.
But before relegating the provision to the realm of con-
gressional oversight,3 8 consider the following situation: X
owns 50 % of corporation A which owns 50 % of corporation B.
X also owns 50% of corporation C. X sells C stock to B. With-
out the provision, X will own 25% of B by beneficial-interest
attribution from corporation A, which will, in turn, be attrib-
uted to corporation C by back attribution. But C's 25% inter-
est in B is not enough for a parent-subsidiary relationship to
exist, nor is X's 25% interest in corporation B enough for a
brother-sister relationship. With the provision, however, X is
deemed to own a 50% interest in corporation B, enough for
both a brother-sister and a parent-subsidiary relationship to
exist. It may be that the relationship should still be cast as
parent-subsidiary, as per the above discussion. In that case
the effect of the provision would simply be to extend section
304 coverage where it would not otherwise exist.
B. Basis Rules
Section 304 is substantially silent on the determination of
basis, either for the corporation or the shareholder.3 ' The
regulations, however, do develop a method for the deter-
mination of basis, at least in the brother-sister area.40
Furthermore, Broadview Lumber,41 along with some of its
38. Similar to I.R.C. § 356(a)(2), according to the argument advanced in Cohen,
Stock Redemptions Through the Use of Controlled Corporations: Why Haserot Was
Wrong, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 289, 304 n.82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cohen] to
the effect that § 304 should override the reorganization sections where both provi-
sions could be applied, rendering the specific dividend treatment in the reorganiza-
tion sections unnecessary. A contra argument is made at text accompanying notes 141
& 142 infra.
39. The only light shed by the section itself is its inclusion of the contribution to
capital rule in I.R.C. § 304(a)(1) (last sentence).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2(a), as amended, T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126.
41. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977).
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predecessors, 42 addressed the question of basis in the parent-
subsidiary situation.
1. Brother-Sister Situation
To deal with the brother-sister area, it is necessary ini-
tially to distinguish two situations: (1) where the constructive
redemption is treated as a dividend, and (2) where the con-
structive redemption meets the tests of section 302(b)43 for
non-dividend equivalency. In the first situation, the contribu-
tion to capital rule 4 will give the acquiring corporation a basis
in the stock constructively redeemed equal to the share-
holder's basis in the stock.45 The shareholder is allowed to
step-up his basis in his remaining shares in the acquiring cor-
poration by an amount equal to his basis in the shares con-
structively redeemed." In a situation in which the shareholder
actually owns no shares of the acquiring corporation but is
deemed to be in control thereof only by attribution, the disap-
pearing basis rules,47 along with Coyle v. United States,48
might have been interpreted to allow the actual owner of the
shares attributed to step-up his basis. However, the Service
has issued a ruling stating it will not allow such a step-up in
42. Webb v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 293 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 572 F.2d 135
(5th Cir. 1978); Virginia Materials Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 372 (1976) (not
dealing directly with the basis question, but dealing with the constructive dividend
issue). See BIrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 21, at 9-51 n.130.
43. This article does not deal specifically with the application of the § 302(b)(1)
essentially equivalent to a dividend test to the context of related-corporation redemp-
tions. As long as a "business purpose" could lead to a finding of nonequivalency, see,
e.g., Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964),
there was some question as to whether related-corporation redemptions could be dis-
tinquished from ordinary redemptions on the basis of the business purpose of inte-
grating the related corporations. Marans, supra note 2, at 208-15; see also Kempf,
supra note 3, at 90-94. With the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Davis, 397 U.S. 301, reh. denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970), however, the business purpose
test was eliminated from consideration under § 302(b)(1), so there is no longer any
reason for related-corporation redemption cases to be treated any differently. See
Brown, supra note 3, at 762-66.
44. I.R.C. § 304(a)(1) (last sentence).
45. I.R.C. § 362(a).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2(a), as amended, T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126.
47. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c), Ex.(2) (1955). See generally Tiger, Sales of
Stock to Related Corporations: Current Problems under Section 304, 40 J. TAX 86,
88-89 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tiger].
48. 415 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1968).
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basis.49 The ruling involved B corporation, 70% of which was
owned by corporation A which also owned 100% of corpora-
tion C. B sold all of the stock of its wholly-owned subsidiary
to corporation C. The Service characterized the relationship
as brother-sister, 50 attributing the interest in corporation C
held by A to B by back attribution. But B owned no actual
shares of C and A was not allowed to step-up its basis in its
shares of C company.
The ruling has been criticized by one commentator as a
departure from Coyle.5 1 One explanation given52 by commen-
tators is that the Service was reluctant to give the actual
owner a step-up in basis because the constructive owner, a
corporation, was eligible for the 85% dividends-received de-
ductin.5 3 That reasoning would seem to indicate that the rul-
ing is limited to the inter-corporate situation, so that if an
individual owns shares in the acquiring corporation only by
attribution, the disappearing basis result will not follow. In-
deed, the Service has subsequently ruled" that an individual
owning shares in the acquiring corporation only by attribu-
tion, who retains some shares in the issuing corporation, will
get a stepped-up basis in the latter shares.5 5 This follows the
spirit, but not the letter of Coyle, in which the actual owner
got the stepped-up basis.
Of course, the basis determination for the shareholder is
also significant in the situation in which the acquiring corpo-
ration's earnings and profits are insufficient to cover the
49. Rev. Rul. 70-496, 1970-2 C.B. 74.
50. It could be so characterized only by application of the corporate attribution
rules and, with their application, it could also be characterized as parent-subsidiary
in the following way: A's 100% of C is attributed to B by back attribution, and B's
100% of C is attributed to its wholly-owned subsidiary by back attribution. The sub-
sidiary, which is the issuing corporation, thereby becomes the parent of C, the acquir-
ing corporation.
Not only would such a characterization be in keeping with the preference which
has been developed, see text accompanying notes 29-35, supra, but it would also elim-
inate the disappearing basis problem, since, in a parent-subsidiary situation, it is the
shareholder's basis in his issuing corporation shares which is affected, and the selling
shareholder always actually owns shares in the issuing corporation, or else he would
have nothing to sell.
51. See Tiger, supra note 47, at 89.
52. Id. at 88.
53. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1).
54. Rev. Rul. 71-563, 1971-2 C.B. 175.
55. See Tiger, supra note 47, at 89 n.19.
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selling price of the issuing corporation's shares. Section
301(c)(2) mandates a reduction in basis in that situation,
which in the brother-sister context would mean a reduction in
the shareholder's basis of his shares in the acquiring corpora-
tion. 6 If the shareholder owns such shares only by attribu-
tion, the preceding discussion will determine whether the ba-
sis of the actual owner is to be reduced, 57 whether the basis of
the shareholder in his remaining shares of the issuing corpora-
tion is to be reduced,58 or whether the entire excess over earn-
ings and profits must be recognized as a gain.9
The second situation in the brother-sister context is one in
which the constructive redemption meets the test of section
302(b) for non-dividend equivalency. In this situation, the
contribution to capital rule 0 will dictate a basis in the shares
acquired which is equal to their cost to the acquiring corpora-
tion."1 This results because the carryover basis from the sell-
ing shareholder will be increased by the amount of the gain
recognized, which is equal to the difference between the sell-
ing price and the shareholder's basis. The shareholder will get
no step-up in basis, since he is deemed to sell back the shares
in the acquiring corporation fictionally received in exchange
for the contribution to capital when he receives the selling
price from the acquiring corporation.
There is some question as to whether the general rule of
nonrecognition to the corporation (section 311(a)) or the rule
of recognition for appreciated property (section 311(d)) ap-
plies in the section 304 situation, since each of the two rules is
limited by its terms to stock of the redeeming corporation.62
The consensus seems to be that both rules apply to construc-
tive redemptions. 6 s By a parity of reasoning, the rule con-
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2(a), as amended, T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126.
57. In accordance with the result in Coyle v. United States, 415 F.2d 488 (4th Cir.
1968).
58. In accordance with the result in Rev. Rul. 71-563, 1971-2 C.B. 175.
59. In accordance with the result in Rev. Rul. 70-496, 1970-2 C.B. 74.
60. I.R.C. § 304(a)(1) (last sentence).
61. See I.R.C. § 362(a) to the effect that the shareholder's gain recognized will be
added to the corporation's basis. This fact is significant in light of the holding in
Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977) that, in the
parent-subsidiary situation, the subsidiary gets a cost basis.
62. See Brown, supra note 3, at 773-74; Tiger, supra note 47, at 89-90.
63. The consensus is, more particularly, that either both apply or neither applies.
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tained in section 312(a)(relating to reduction of the earnings
and profits of the distributing corporation by the amount of
the dividend) should also apply in the case of a brother-sister
redemption which constitutes a dividend.e" Such reasoning is
even clearer, since section 304 treats the distribution consti-
tuting a dividend as one made with respect to the stock of the
acquiring corporation. 5
Under the foregoing analysis, the tax accounting effect on
the acquiring corporation of a brother-sister redemption con-
stituting a dividend would be as follows: (1) a debit to other
assets and a credit to contributions to capital in the amount
of the basis of the stock sold; (2) a debit to earnings and prof-
its and a credit to cash (or other property account) in the
amount of the selling price.6 However, when the constructive
redemption is not treated as a dividend in the brother-sister
situation, the tax accounting effect is as follows: (1) a debit to
other assets and a credit to contributions to capital in the
amount of the basis of the stock sold plus the gain recognized
by the shareholder; (2) a debit to contributions to capital 67
and a credit to cash (or other property account) in the amount
of the selling price.' In effect, then, the contribution to capi-
tal is removed from the books and the transaction is treated
as a purchase of the stock with a basis equal to its cost.
2. Parent-Subsidiary Situation
With respect to the parent-subsidiary situation, the silence
of the statute on the subject of basis determination is
matched by silence in the regulations.6 9 The contribution to
capital rule is not mentioned in the parent-subsidiary situa-
tion as it is in the brother-sister situation. However, with
See Brown, supra note 3, at 774 n.107; Tiger, supra note 47, at 90. But see Treas.
Reg. § 1.311-2(a)(2) (1972) (§ 311(d) applies in § 304 situations).
64. See Brown, supra note 3, at 773-74; Marans, supra note 2, at 176.
65. Particularly in view of the fact that the amount of the dividend is determined
by the earnings and profits of the acquiring corporation. I.R.C. § 304(b)(2)(A).
66. Marans, supra note 2, at 177.
67. See Marans, supra note 2, at 177-79 for a discussion of why the entire amount
of the distribution is "properly chargeable to capital account" under I.R.C. § 312(e),
so that no earnings and profits are carried out.
68. See Marans, supra note 2, at 179.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.304-3(a) (1955) deals only with the situation of dividend
equivalency.
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respect to the question of whose earnings and profits account
is charged if the constructive redemption is treated as a divi-
dend, the statute does provide in the parent-subsidiary situa-
tion for a hypothetical distribution from the subsidiary to the
parent followed by a distribution in redemption from the par-
ent.7 0 This would seem to suggest some type of charge both to
the subsidiary and to the parent. 1
The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Broadview Lum-
ber,7 2 however, has implications both for the question of basis
determination and for the question of charging earnings and
profits. The court was faced, inter alia, with two issues: (1) In
a parent-subsidiary constructive redemption, does the parent
recognize a constructive dividend from the subsidiary? (2)
Does the subsidiary get a cost basis in the parent's stock? The
case involved a sale by the parent's sole shareholder of all the
parent's stock to the subsidiary. This resulted in a section
302(b)(3) complete termination of interest, so the constructive
redemption was not treated as a dividend to the shareholder.
In dealing first with the constructive dividend issue, the
court was faced with a ruling by the Service to the effect that
such a dividend would be recognized by the parent.7 3 In very
broad language, the court rejected that ruling; however, in a
footnote, 4 the court arguably limited its holding to the facts
of the case in which the shareholder did not receive dividend
treatment. On the second issue of a cost basis to the subsidi-
ary, the court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the
contribution to capital rule should apply to the parent-subsid-
iary situation as well, but indicated, again in a footnote 7 that
the argument against a cost basis depended on the contribu-
tion to capital rule only because the constructive dividend ar-
gument was rejected. This means that if the constructive divi-
dend holding is limited to situations of non-dividend
equivalency, the cost basis holding should be so limited as
well.
To start with the known and then proceed to the un-
70. I.I.C. § 304(b)(2)(B). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.304-3(a) (1955).
71. See Marans, supra note 2, at 175.
72. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977).
73. Rev. Rul. 69-261, 1969-1 C.B. 94.
74. 561 F.2d at 705 n.12.
75. Id. at 706 n.14.
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known, the Broadview Lumber76 case does determine the situ-
ation of non-dividend equivalency in the parent-subsidiary
context. The subsidiary receives a cost basis in the parent's
stock. Since there is no contribution to the subsidiary's capital
by the shareholder and he is deemed, rather, to sell the stock,
the shareholder must deduct the basis of the stock sold from
his basis in his remaining stock of the parent.7 7 Since the sub-
sidiary gets a cost basis in the stock, the entire amount is
debited to the subsidiary's assets and no charge need be made
to earnings and profits (as would be .the case if the subsidiary
were redeeming its own stock). 8
So much for the known; now for the unknown. As indi-
cated before, the Broadview Lumber7 case can be read
broadly enough to always give the subsidiary a cost basis in
the parent's stock,80 even in the situation of dividend
equivalency. But, it is submitted that this would lead to in-
consistent tax accounting results. In the situation of dividend
equivalency, there is necessarily a charge to the subsidiary's
earnings and profits in the amount of the distribution.8 1 There
may also be a charge to the subsidiary's assets since it now
has stock in its parent which it did not previously have, with
the amount of the charge equal to the subsidiary's basis in the
stock. In addition, there is a credit to cash (or other property
account) in the amount of the distribution, which matches the
charge to earnings and profits. Furthermore there must be a
credit in the amount of the charge to assets for the stock in
the parent, the amount of which will determine the basis of
that stock. If the amount of that credit is equal to the cost of
the stock, the question arises: What account is to be so
credited? It cannot be a contribution to capital account, be-
cause a contribution to capital would have a carryover basis
since no gain is recognized to the shareholder. 2 If the amount
to be credited were equal to the basis of the stock, the account
to be credited would have to be a contribution to capital ac-
76. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977).
77. See Marans, supra note 2, at 172-73.
78. Under LR.C. § 312(e). See Marans, supra note 2, at 173.
79. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977).
80. See BirrKER & EUSTMCE, supra note 21, at 9-51 n.130.
81. I.R.C. § 312(a).
82. I.R.C. § 362(a).
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count, since, in the case of a shareholder contribution to capi-
tal,8' the basis of the property contributed in the hands of the
shareholder is carried over to the corporation. But the contri-
bution to capital rule cannot apply since the court in Broad-
view Lumber"4 clearly indicated that that rule does not apply
in the parent-subsidiary situation. Furthermore, for the cor-
poration to get a step-up in basis, the shareholder's basis in
the contributed property would have to be reduced, as in the
brother-sister situation where the shareholder's basis in his is-
suing corporation stock is reduced by his basis in the contrib-
uted stock. It is clear, however, that his basis in the stock of
the parent is not reduced in the parent-subsidiary dividend
equivalency situation.85 If that is the case, that is, that his ba-
sis in his shares of the parent is unchanged, then his basis in
his shares of the subsidiary, if any, is not stepped-up. The
corporation's basis in contributed property reflects the share-
holder's step-up in basis in his shares of that corporation.
Since the shareholder gets no step-up in basis from the con-
tributed shares, the subsidiary's basis in those shares must be
zero.
If Broadview Lumber,"" holding that the subsidiary gets a
cost basis, is limited to the non-dividend equivalency situa-
tion, then the Commissioner's argument in the dividend
equivalency situation must be sound. That argument"7 was
based on the constructive dividend theory, so that theory
83. In the parent-subsidiary situation, the selling shareholder is not necessarily a
shareholder in the acquiring corporation. Thus, it may be possible to reach the same
result (that is, a zero basis in the contributed stock to the acquiring corporation)
under § 362(c), dealing with nonshareholder contributions.
It is arguable, however, that the shareholder contribution rules of § 362(a) apply
under § 304. The Service has held in the brother-sister situation, where the selling
shareholder owned stock in the acquiring corporation only by attribution, that the
sale of stock would nevertheless be treated as a shareholder contribution to capital.
Rev. Rul. 77-427, 1977-2 C.B. 100.
The brother-sister situation may be distinguishable, though, because § 304(a)(1)
requires control of the acquiring corporation. It would be anomalous to treat the sell-
ing shareholder as in control for purposes of § 304 but not as a shareholder for pur-
poses of § 362(a). In the parent-subsidiary situation, no such control of the acquiring
corporation is required, so it would not be anamolous to apply § 304(a)(2) and also to
apply the nonshareholder contribution to capital rules of § 362(c).
84. 561 F.2d at 705-09.
85. Tress. Reg. § 1.304-3(a) (1955) (last sentence).
86. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977).
87. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
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must be applicable in the dividend equivalency situation and
the court's rejection of it must be limited to the non-dividend
equivalency situation.8e If that is the case, the Service's rul-
ings9 is correct for the dividend equivalency situation and the
following tax accounting effects are incurred by the parent: (1)
cash is debited and a special earnings and profits account90 is
credited to reflect the hypothetical distribution from the sub-
sidiary to the parent; (2) the entries are reversed to reflect the
hypothetical distribution from the parent to its shareholder.
C. Application of Section 304.to Second-Tier Subsidiaries
In a situation involving a wholly-owned subsidiary, Z, of a
wholly-owned subsidiary, Y, where Z sold all of its stock in its
wholly-owned subsidiary, S, to Y, the Service has ruled that
section 304 is inapplicable.9 The ruling has been hailed in
some circles2 while questioned in others.93 The theory behind
the ruling was that control of Y could not be attributed to Z
without attributing to Y ownership of its own stock." The
reasoning was that the only way to attribute to Z the owner-
ship of Y would be first to attribute the ownership of Y by its
parent, X, to Y by back attribution and then to attribute the
ownership of Y from Y to Z by back attribution. The effect of
avoiding application of section 304 would be to eliminate the
intercorporate 85% dividends received deduction.' 5
One commentator has questioned the ruling" because
88. See 561 F.2d at 705 n.12.
89. Rev. Rul. 69-261, 1969-1 C.B. 94. The Service has retreated from this position,
however, in Rev. Rul. 80-189, 1980-29 I.R.B. 7, holding, in the dividend equivalency
situation, that (1) there is no constructive dividend to the parent, and (2) the subsidi-
ary receives a cost basis.
90. A special account must be used to avoid setting off the amount of the divi-
dend by any deficit in the parent's earnings and profits account. The use of special
accounts in connection with redemptions is explained in Nesson, Earnings and Pr-of-
its Discontinuities Under the 1954 Code, 77 HARv. L. REv. 450, 459 (1964). See gen-
erally Marans, supra note 2, at 175-76.
91. Rev. Rul. 74-605, 1974-2 C.B. 97.
92. BrrrKxER & EUSTcE, supra note 21, at 9-49 n.120.
93. D. K HN & P. Gm-N, CoRpoATE TAXATION 254 (1979).
94. Which would be contrary to Treas. Reg. § 1.318-1(b)(1), as amended, T.D.
6969, 1963-2 C.B. 126, which precludes a corporation from having its own stock at-
tributed to it.
95. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1), which would not apply if the transaction were treated as
what it seems to be on its face, that is, a sale.
96. D. KAHN & P. GANN, CoRPoRATE TAxATION 254 (1979).
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there is no need to attribute the stock of Y to Y in order to
attribute it to Z.97 Rather, Y's ownership of Z could first be
attributed to X by beneficial-interest attribution. Then X's
ownership of Y could be attributed to Z by back attribution.
Z would then get Y's stock without any corporation having its
own stock attributed to itself.
In the same vein, the ruling expresses a preference for
brother-sister characterization over parent-subsidiary charac-
terization. Alternatively, the ownership of Y could be attrib-
uted to S by adding just one more step to the chain of attribu-
tion outlined above. Once ownership of Z is attributed from Y
to X by beneficial-interest attribution, ownership of S can be
attributed from Z to X, also by beneficial-interest attribution.
Then ownership of Y can be attributed from X to S by back
attribution, so that S becomes the parent of Y. This is also
accomplished without any corporation having its own stock
attributed t6 it and would allow the relationship to be charac-
terized as one of parent-subsidiary rather than as one of
brother-sister.
IV. CONFLICTS WITH OTHER SECTIONS
A. Section 351
The conflict between sections 304 and 351 can be illus-
trated by the following simplified facts: X, who owns 100% of
corporations A and B, transfers part of his stock in A to B in
exchange for more stock of B and other property (boot).9 8
Under section 304 the transfer qualifies as a brother-sister
constructive redemption so that the boot received from corpo-
ration B will constitute a dividend to the shareholder on his B
company stock. Under section 351, on the other hand, the
stock from corporation B is received tax-free; gain on the
transfer is recognized, but only to the extent of the boot. If
the gain is less than the boot, only the gain will be taxed.
The issue is not exactly one of first impression, having
been dealt with by the Sixth Circuit in the Haserot-Stickney
series of cases99 and by the Ninth Circuit in Rose Ann Coates
97. See Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 714 n.36 (7th Cir.
1977).
98. The example is taken substantially from Cohen, supra note 38, at 300.
99. Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968), aff'g sub. nom. Hase-
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Trust v. Commissioner.100 The Sixth Circuit held that section
351 takes precedence but the Ninth Circuit took the opposite
view. The problem has been extensively commented upon 01
and was at one timethe subject of a House proposal 0 2 which
would have given legislative preference to section 304. The ar-
guments essentially boil down to two types: those based on
statutory construction and those based on policy.
The arguments based on statutory construction begin with
the fact that section 304 depends for its operation on sections
301(a) and 302(d). The former section contains the language
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter," and the latter
section contains the language "Except as otherwise provided
in this subchapter." Section 351, so the argument goes, pro-
vides otherwise, and it is in the same chapter as 301(a) and
302(d). 103 The Commissioner's response to the argument is
that after all, a host of other sections in Chapter 1 could con-
ceivably be applied to any redemption transaction, construc-
tive or otherwise, and to give them precedence would be to
render sections 301(a) and 302(d) nugatory.'0' At the other ex-
treme, the "except as otherwise provided" language could be
interpreted as referring only to those sections, such as 331(b)
and 346(c), which expressly refer to section 301 and/or section
302.105 A middle ground would be to interpret the limiting
language as referring to all other distribution and redemption
sections in subchapter C, thereby excluding section 351 which
is neither a distribution nor a redemption section.' 6
An attempt is also made to distinguish between a "sale"
and an "exchange. "' It is argued that section 304 applies
only when the transaction can be exclusively characterized as
rot v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 864 (1966), on remand from 355 F.2d 200 (6th Cir.
1965), remanding 41 T.C. 562 (1964). For an excellent review of the facts of that case
see Cohen, supra note 38, at 293-94 n.29.
100. 480 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), af'g 55 T.C. 501
(1970).
101. E.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 783-90; Cohen, supra note 38; Kempf, supra
note 3, at 66-75; Marans, supra note 2, at 181-89.
102. H.R. 1040, § 309, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1973. See Brown, supra note 3, at 784.
103. Haserot v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. at 570 (1964); Commissioner v. Stickney,
399 F.2d at 834-35.
104. See Marans, supra note 2, at 184-85.
105. See Kempf, supra note 3, at 71.
106. See id. at 70; see also Cohen, supra note 38, at 297-98 n.46.
107. See Marans, supra note 2, at 188-89.
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a "sale" and that occurs only when there is no stock received
in return. When such stock is so received, the transaction is
characterized as an "exchange," to which only section 351 ap-
plies. The argument can be countered by pointing out, first of
all, that section 304 says nothing about a "sale"; it speaks only
of a corporation acquiring stock,108 and then proceeds to clas-
sify that acquisition as a redemption or distribution. Acquisi-
tion is broad enough to encompass both sales and exchanges,
especially since the effect of section 304 is to recast the trans-
action as anything but a sale.
Closely related to this argument is the one based on the
definition of property for purposes of part I of subchapter C
as excluding stock in the issuing corporation. 10 9 Since stock of
the acquiring corporation is also issued in the transaction and
received by the shareholder, and section 304 requires the re-
ceipt of "property," it is argued that section 304 could not ap-
ply.1 20 The easy answer to this is that section 304 does not
require that only "property" be received, and it is conceded
that the section does not apply to the receipt of the stock,
though not necessarily by the operation of section 351.111 But
the answer is not so easy upon further analysis. Bifurcation of
a transaction is not favored in the tax law; 11 2 why utilize sec-
tion 304 which can only apply to part of the transaction when
351 will apply to the whole?
Section 351, it is argued, has been held in the past to give
way to other sections of the Code, such as section 482.1' Why,
then, should section 351 not also give way to section 304? The
answer given is that section 482 by its terms takes precedence
over all other sections.1 1 4
108. See Brown, supra note 3, at 787.
109. I.R.C. § 317(a).
110. See Brown, supra note 3, at 787; see also Cohen, supra note 38, at 296.
111. The Commissioner in the Haserot case argued that the stock received should
be treated as a stock dividend under I.R.C. § 305, rather than as having been received
in exchange for the stock of the issuing corporation under I.R.C. § 351. See Marans,
supra note 2, at 192.
112. Marans, supra note 2, at 185.
113. E.g., Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962); National Sec.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943). Section 482, of course, gives the
Commissioner the power to reallocate income, deductions, credits and losses among
related entities for the purpose of preventing tax avoidance and so as to clearly reflect
income.
114. See Marans, supra note 2, at 184. The section provides that it is to apply
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The legislative history is considered by some to be incon-
clusive. 1 5 The House would have expressly made the reorgan-
ization provisions subject to the distribution sections, while
the Senate in rejecting that proposal left the House version of
section 304 intact.116 Others11 7 take a broader view of the leg-
islative history and argue that section 351 was always in-
tended as merely an exception to the general rule of recogni-
tion of gain on a sale or exchange. Since section 304 operates
to recharacterize the transaction as something other than a
sale or exchange, the general rule does not apply; hence, the
exception thereto is also inapplicable." 8
The Commissioner has used an argument based upon the
absurdity of forcing dividend treatment on a 50-80% share-
holder while according exchange treatment to an 80% or
greater shareholder.1 If anything, the 80% shareholder, who
has greater control, is more likely to abuse his position by
bailing out at capital gains rates the earnings and profits of
one corporation by use of another corporation. It defeats the
whole purpose of section 304 to extend to the 80% share-
holder the privilege of exchange treatment, while denying it to
a shareholder with lesser control.1 20 It may also be pointed out
that giving precedence to section 351 in this case could lead to
the avoidance of dividend treatment in the situation of a re-
demption by a corporation of its own stock. Since the defini-
tion of "property" excluding stock of the corporation applies
only to part I of subchapter C, a section 351 exchange with
boot could be effected if, for example, a 100% shareholder
turns in 20% of his stock in the corporation for 10% of the
same stock and 10% worth of boot. Therefore, an 80% or
greater shareholder would, always be able to avoid dividend
treatment on a redemption as long as he retains 80% control
afterwards. He thus, effectively circumvents the requirements
"[i]n any case." I.R.C. § 482.
115. See Marans, supra note 2, at 188.
116. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 239-40 (1954).
117. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 300-03.
118. Id. at 303.
119. Id. at 298-99. See also Kempf, supra note 3, at 74.
120. The tax court acknowledged this argument when it recognized that "greater
control (with concommitant greater power for mischief) may confer the benefits of
capital gains treatment." Haserot v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. at 570.
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of section 302.
A number of alternative resolutions of the conflict between
sections 304 and 351 have been suggested.121 One possibility is
to apply section 351 to the receipt of stock and section 304 to
the receipt of boot, 122 which is the position adopted by the
Ninth Circuit.1 23 Another alternative is to apply section 304 to
the boot and section 305 (stock dividends) to the stock.1 21
This latter suggestion was argued by the Commissioner. 125
This approach might lead to the tax-free receipt of the stock
even for shareholders without 80% control. 2 The possibility
also exists of integrating sections 304 and 351, with section
304 to be applied to characterize the gain recognized by sec-
tion 351(b) as ordinary income.1 27 A fourth alternative is to
bypass section 304 altogether and apply section 301 directly to
the receipt of boot, treating it as a distribution on the stock of
the acquiring128 corporation. 129 All of the basis of the stock
transferred to the corporation would be allocated to the stock
of the corporation received in exchange, so that if that basis is
more than the fair market value of the stock received, the
121. See generally Marans, supra note 2, at 189-97.
122. Id. at 191-92. Marans also suggests an integrated § 304 § 351 approach,
under which the amount to be taxed would be determined under § 351(b), while
§ 304 would apply to tax that amount as ordinary income. He criticizes that ap-
proach as illogical, for if § 304 applies at all, it would be to characterize the boot as a
distribution on the stock retained, not as received in exchange for the stock given up.
As such, the entire amount of the boot must be available for taxation, rather than
limiting the tax to the amount of the gain in all cases. Marans, Section 304: The
Shadowy World Revisited, 22 TAx L. REv. 721, 722-23 (1967).
123. Coates Trust v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1045 (1973), aff'g 55 T.C. 501 (1970). In that case no stock, but only a long-term note,
was received by the selling shareholders. The tax court, in fact, originally held section
351 inapplicable by not characterizing the note as a security. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, squarely faced the issue and found section 304 to supersede. See Brown, supra
note 3, at 788-90. The lesson to be learned is that no one, the Commissioner or the
taxpayer, should take a case to court with bad facts.
124. Marans, supra note 2, at 192-94.
125. Id. at 192.
126. Id. at 193-94.
127. See note 122 supra.
128. In an appropriate situation, the Service may characterize the boot as a § 301
distribution from the issuing corporation. See Rev. Rul. 80-239, 1980-36 I.R.B. 7 (boot
received from acquiring corporation, financed by loan which was guaranteed by issu-
ing corporation and repaid with dividends from issuing corporation, treated as re-
ceived from issuing corporation).
129. Marans, supra note 2, at 194-95.
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amount of the boot to be treated as a dividend will be re-
duced.130 That would make this fourth alternative preferable
to the individual taxpayer over the first alternative, which
would allocate the basis of the stock transferred between the
stock received and the boot, with the result that the full
amount of the boot would be treated as a dividend. Of course,
if the value of the stock received exceeds the basis of the stock
transferred, it would be preferable to have section 304, rather
than section 301, apply, since if section 304 applies, only the
amount of the boot will be treated as a dividend, while if sec-
tion 301 applies, the entire gain, even that part attributable to
the stock received, 31 will be treated as a dividend.
So, if the boot is treated under section 351(b), the lesser of
the gain or the boot will be recognized. If it is treated under
section 304, the amount of the boot will always be recognized.
If, on the other hand, it is treated under section 301, the
amount of the gain will always be recognized.
To add yet another voice to the chorus, it is submitted
that an argument might be made that section 304 treatment
of the boot received is provided for by the Code. First, it must
be recognized that section 304 does not come into conflict at
all with section 351(a). Section 351(a) covers the situation in
which only stock or securities are received in exchange for
property transferred to the corporation. While the receipt of
securities could be covered by section 304,132 it will, for sim-
plicity, be assumed that only stock is received. Section 304, on
the other hand, requires that "property" be received from the
corporation,13 3 and the stock of the corporation is excluded
130. See id.
131. See Treas. Reg. §1.351-2(d) (1955) for the suggestion that stock received in a
section 351 exchange could bd taxed as a dividend when its receipt has the effect of
the receipt of a taxable dividend.
132. This was the posture of the conflict in Coates Trust v. Commissioner, 480
F.2d 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), aff'd, 55 T.C. 501 (1970). See
note 124 supra.
133. The assumption by a newly formed acquiring corporation of the liability of
the transferor, incurred in the acquisition of the stock transferred to the acquiring
corporation, has been held by the Service not to constitute "property" received from
the acquiring corporation. Rev. Rul. 80-240, 1980-36 I.R.B. 8. The ruling took note of
the fact that there were nontax reasons for the acquiring corporation to have acquired
the stock through the shareholder, rather than directly. As such, the ruling's conclu-
sion was based on treating the shareholder as a mere agent for the acquiring
corporation.
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from the definition of the term "property" by section 317(a).
Thus, as long as only stock is received, that is, as long as sec-
tion 351(a) is applicable, there is no conflict with section 304.
The conflict arises only when property other than stock
(assuming no securities are received) is received from the cor-
poration. When that is the case, section 351(b) controls. That
section, by its terms, applies only when section 351(a) would
apply but for the fact that property is received which is not
permitted to be received thereunder. Accordingly, if there is
any other reason for section 351(a) not to apply, apart from
the fact that something other than stock (or securities) is re-
ceived, section 351(b) will not apply. When the property
transferred to the corporation is stock of another corporation,
then, aside from the fact that impermissible property is re-
ceived, section 351(a) does not apply because impermissible
property is transferred, that is, property the transfer of which
may lead to a different result under section 304. Therefore,
section 351(a) would not apply but for the fact that impermis-
sible property is received. By its express terms section 351(b)
would not apply to the section 304 situation. As such, there is
no conflict with section 304.
In the section 351(a) situation where only stock is received,
section 304 is rendered inapplicable. In the section 351(b) sit-
uation where property other than stock or securities is re-
ceived, section 351(b) is rendered inapplicable. Since it is that
latter section, dealing with the boot, that section 304 renders
inapplicable, and not section 351(a) dealing with the stock,
section 304 can apply only to the boot and not to the stock.
Therefore, it follows that the full amount of the boot is
treated as a redemption to be tested under section 302(b), re-
gardless of the amount of the gain.
B. "D" Reorganizations
To illustrate this area of potential conflict, consider the
following example: X, an 80% shareholder in corporation A,
pursuant to a plan of reorganization, sets up another corpora-
tion, B, in which he owns 100% of the stock. Corporation A
sells all of its assets to corporation B and liquidates, distribut-
ing to X his share of the proceeds.1 3 4 The situation fits all the
134. These were substantially the facts in Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304
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elements of a "D" reorganization, namely: (1) a transfer by a
corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation;
(2) shareholders of the transferor corporation controlling
(80% or more of) the transferee corporation; and (3) a distri-
bution of stock in the transferee corporation pursuant to a
plan of reorganization.1 3 5
With a little ingenuity an attempt can be made to recast
the transaction as a section 304 redemption. If the sale of as-
sets by corporation A to corporation B can be equated with a
sale of stock of A to B, with the distribution deemed to be
coming from B rather than A, the elements of section 304 are
satisfied.136 To recast the sale of assets as a sale of stock would
require no more than the reverse of the reasoning applied in
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner."87
The difference in treatment depending upon which charac-
terization is adopted can be substantial. Section 356(a)(2) pro-
vides for dividend treatment of boot received in a reorganiza-
tion. However, the effect of such treatment is ameliorated in
the following ways: (1) only the gain recognized in the reor-
ganization exchange will receive dividend treatment; (2) that
gain will be so treated only to the extent of accumulated earn-
ings and profits 38 and only to the extent of the shareholder's
ratable share thereof. Under section 304, on the other hand,
the entire amount of boot received is eligible for dividend
treatment, to the full extent of all the acquiring corporation's
earnings and profits, both accumulated and current.
Although the acquiring corporation is newly organized, and
therefore has no earnings and profits, it may nevertheless be
possible to accord dividend treatment to the distribution
under section 304. The acquiring corporation is deemed to be
making the distribution of boot under the recharacterization
of the transaction. By further recharacterizing the transaction,
the acquiring corporation may also be deemed to have re-
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956) in which a "D" reorganization was found.
See generally Kempf, supra note 3, at 75-81. See also note 148, infra.
135. Kempf, supra note 3, at 78.
136. See id. at 83-84 for the suggestion that Kimbell-Diamond could be extended
to convert a sale of assets to a sale of stock. See also Marans, supra note 2, at 195-96.
137. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 827 (1951).
138. See Brown, supra note 3, at 793.
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deemed its stock in the issuing corporation (deemed to have
been received in place of the assets) in exchange for the boot
needed to make the distribution. This is in accord with the
substance of the transaction, because otherwise, its absence of
ownership of the stock of the issuing corporation could not be
accounted for, nor could its receipt of the boot needed to
make the distribution. With the transaction so recharacter-
ized, the acquiring corporation's earnings and profits would be
increased," 9 at least in the amount of the gain on the reorgan-
ization exchange. Thus, the limitations on dividend treatment
based on the inclusion of only accumulated earnings and prof-
its and the shareholder's ratable share thereof would not
apply.
The commentators, however, seem to concur that section
304 would give way to the reorganization provisions in a case
like the aforementioned. 140 Their application is more direct,
more comprehensive, and they expressly contemplate divi-
dend treatment. It has been suggested, however, that if a new
corporation is soon thereafter set up to take the place of the
old, the preference for the reorganization provisions may
diminish.141
C. Partial Liquidations
A partial liquidation under section 346(b) requires that the
corporation close out an entirely separate business which it
had previously been operating.142 Two situations must be dis-
tinguished in this area.1 43 In the first, a subsidiary is partially
liquidating and the shareholders of the parent realize the pro-
ceeds thereof by selling stock of the parent to the subsidiary.
A section 304 characterization would consider the corporation
as not redeeming its own stock. On the other hand, a section
346 characterization would reflect the fact that the corpora-
tion making the distribution is partially liquidating, and it is
only through a fiction that the distribution would be consid-
ered as coming from the parent under section 304.
The commentators seem to agree that section 304 would
139. I.R.C. § 312(f)(1).
140. Kempf, supra note 3, at 82; Marans, supra note 2, at 207.
141. Kempf, supra note 3, at 82-83.
142. See generally Brown, supra note 3, at 790-92.
143. See Marans, supra note 2, at 201-02.
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clearly give way here."" Where this is not so obvious, however,
is in the situation where it is the parent which is partially liq-
uidating and its shareholders sell their stock to the subsidi-
ary.145 In that case, the corporation actually making the distri-
bution is neither redeeming its own stock nor is it partially
liquidating. Most of the authorities' advise that section 304
treatment is likely, 46 although it is suggested that in the situ-
ation of non-dividend equivalency under the tests of section
302(b), treatment under section 304 would be only slightly
less innocuous under these circumstances than treatment
under section 346(a). 47
D. Liquidation-Reincorporation
The pattern here, which has been presented to the courts
on a number of occasions, 148 is basically as follows: X, who
controls corporation A, has A adopt a plan of complete liqui-
dation pursuant to section 337. X sets up a new corporation,
B, in which X retains only 75% control and either has corpo-
ration A sell its assets to corporation B and distribute the
cash in liquidation or distribute its assets in liquidation to X
who sells them to corporation B. This resembles a "D" reor-
ganization, except for the fact that X does not control 49 the
transferee corporation. By the simple expedient of retaining
less than 80% control, X avoids the dividend treatment of
section 356(a)(2), and apparently is entitled to section
144. Brown, supra note 3, at 790; Marans, supra note 2, at 202.
145. See Marans, supra note 2, at 201.
146. Id.
147. United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961). See generally Diamond,
"Brother-Sister Corporations" - Sale of Stock or Other Assets, and Other
Problems, 1959 So. CAL. TAX INST. 109, 131-32.
148. E.g., Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); Cramer v. Commissioner, 20
T.C. 679 (1953). See generally Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground
Rules Really Changed?, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1218 (1964). Recent cases have dealt with
the liquidation-reincorporation problem by holding the purported liquidation to be a
"D" reorganization. This result has been accomplished by stretching the definition of
a "D" reorganization, particularly the "substantially all" requirement of
§ 354(b)(1(A). See Simon v. Comm'r, 644 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981); Smothers v.
United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981); Atlas Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 614 F.2d 860
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 110 (1980); Davant v. Comm'r, 366 F.2d 874 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967); Moffat v. Comm'r, 363 F.2d 262 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967).
149. As defined, for purposes of part HI of subchapter C, in I.R.C. § 368(c), which
requires at least 80% control.
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331(a)(1) capital gains treatment.
However, recasting the sale of assets as sale of stock in the
liquidating corporation by the sharholder to the transferee
corporation, the transaction can be made to fit the require-
ments of section 304, in the same way as suggested for the
"D" reorganization. 150 The arguments against having section
304 take precedence over the reorganization provisions do not
apply here with equal force. Although the liquidation provi-
sions are comprehensive, they do not contemplate dividend
treatment as do the reorganization provisions. 151
As suggested earlier, the sale of assets rather than stock
problem could be surmounted with a reverse Kimbell-Dia-
mond152 argument. A more difficult problem is presented by
the fact that section 331 expressly excludes the application of
section 301. To counter this problem the Commissioner would
have to argue that the liquidation was nothing more than a
sham, so that section 331 would not apply. 53
If section 304 treatment were accorded the transaction, the
amount of the dividend would be measured by the newly
formed acquiring corporation's earnings and profits. Given
this treatment, it has been suggested that the corporate rela-
tionship be recast as that of parent-subsidiary. 54 In view of
our earlier discussion of the implications of Broadview Lum-
ber,15  such a characterization would seem unlikely. However,
the suggestion made earlier in the section on "D" reorganiza-
tions 58 (that a redemption by the issuing corporation from
the acquiring corporation of the issuing corporation's stock
could be hypothesized, giving the acquiring corporation earn-
ings and profits in the amount of the reorganization gain),
may be applicable here as well, thus giving the acquiring cor-
poration earnings and profits in the amount of the liquidation
gain.
Other commentators have suggested that there is little evi-
150. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
151. See Kempf, supra note 3, at 84-86.
152. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 827 (1951).
153. Kempf, supra note 3, at 85.
154. Id. at 87-89.
155. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
156. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
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dence that Congress intended section 304 to be so broad.157
That may be, but there is nothing to stop the Commissioner
from trying to so stretch the section. Therefore, section 304
certainly is a tax planner's nightmare.158
157. Marans, supra note 2, at 203-05.
158. Id. at 216.
1980]

